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THE LIABILITY OF NOTIFIED BODIES UNDER THE EU’S NEW 
APPROACH: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PIP BREAST IMPLANTS 
CASE (C-219/15) 
Paul Verbruggen and Barend van Leeuwen*  
Abstract 
In this article, we analyse the consequences of the CJEU’s judgment in Schmitt, a preliminary 
reference concerning the potential liability of the notified body TÜV Rheinland vis-à-vis women 
who had received breast implants produced by the French manufacturer Poly Implant Prothèse 
SA (“PIP”). Our discussion focusses on (i) the impact of the judgment on the damages actions 
women have brought against TÜV Rheinland before national courts; (ii) the future regulation of 
medical devices in the EU; and (iii) the regulation of private standardisation and certification in 
EU law. We argue that Schmitt can be seen as part of a broader trend in the case law of the CJEU, 
in which private regulatory activities are gradually submitted to fundamental principles of EU law. 
While this ‘constitutionalisation’ of private regulation strengthens the public accountability of 
these alternative forms of regulation, it also poses fundamental challenges to their current design 
and internal governance. 
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Introduction 
In February 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU” or “Court”) delivered its 
judgment in Schmitt, a preliminary reference on the potential liability of the notified body TÜV 
Rheinland (“TÜV”) vis-à-vis women who had received breast implants produced by the French 
manufacturer Poly Implant Prothèse SA (“PIP”).1 The claimant, Ms Schmitt, was one of the 
many thousands of women who have fallen victim to the fraudulent activities of PIP. Schmitt 
concerns a key question in the legal aftermath of the so-called PIP breast implants scandal: is 
TÜV, as a private certification body which conducted inspections required by EU law at PIP’s 
factory, liable for the material and immaterial harm suffered by women who received PIP breast 
implants?  
In this article, we will focus on the question of what – actual and potential – implications the 
CJEU’s judgment has in relation to four issues. First of all, we discuss the relationship between 
the New Approach, the regulatory framework in which breast implants are placed on the EU 
market, and civil liability of certification bodies. Second, we analyse the impact of the judgment 
on damages actions brought by Ms Schmitt and other women against TÜV before national 
courts. We then consider how the judgment relates to the future regulation of medical devices in 
the EU under the new rules that will apply from 2020. Fourth and finally, we identify a broader 
trend in the case law of the CJEU, of which Schmitt is a recent example: the 
“constitutionalisation” of private regulation. The judgments in Fra.bo and James Elliott already 
broke new ground in gradually submitting private standardisation and certification activities to 
fundamental principles of EU law, and we will discuss what Schmitt adds to this trend.  
                                                   
* Paul Verbruggen is Assistant Professor of Global and Comparative Private Law at Tilburg Law School. Barend van 
Leeuwen is Assistant Professor in European Law at Durham Law School. This contribution is part of the project 
‘The Constitutionalization of Private Regulation’ funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research 
under the VENI scheme. Visit www.paulverbruggen.nl/projects for more information. 
1 Elisabeth Schmitt v TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH (C-219/15), ECLI:EU:C:2017:128. 
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However, before the implications of Schmitt are analysed, we have to provide some context to the 
analysis. Therefore, we first discuss the background to the PIP breast implants scandal, the 
applicable regulatory framework and the CJEU’s judgment.  
The PIP breast implants scandal 
PIP was a well-known manufacturer of silicone breast implants.2 It was based in France and 
founded in 1991, but soon started to operate on a worldwide basis. Around 2000, the 
management of PIP decided to save costs on the type of silicone gel used in breast implants. 
Instead of the required medical silicone gel, PIP started to use a much cheaper type of industrial 
silicone gel in breach of the relevant French and European safety standards. PIP did so on an 
entirely random basis – some breast implants were filled with the required medical silicone gel, 
while others were filled with industrial silicone gel. It managed to cover the use of industrial 
silicone gel for a substantial period of time. PIP successfully kept its purchases of significant 
amounts of industrial silicone gel outside its business records and falsified invoices to make it 
look like the expected amount of medical silicone gel had been bought. In 2009, the French 
public supervisory agency received information about potential problems with the breast 
implants manufactured by PIP. In 2010, criminal investigations were started, which eventually led 
to the discovery of the fraud. PIP’s breast implants were immediately taken off the market. PIP 
was declared bankrupt in 2010. Moreover, the management of PIP was sentenced to lengthy 
sentences of imprisonment. 
By the time of the discovery of the fraud in 2010, hundreds of thousands of women all over the 
world had already received PIP breast implants. In the absence of adequate national systems to 
register the use of breast implants, many women who received breast implants could not be 
certain whether their implants had actually been manufactured by PIP. Even if they did know, 
                                                   
2 For more background, see B. van Leeuwen, “PIP Breast Implants, the EU’s New Approach for Goods and Market 
Surveillance by Notified Bodies” (2014) 5 European Journal of Risk Regulation 338 and P. Rott and C. Glinski, 
‘Ramsch-Brustimplantate: Ein Lehrstück europäischer Produktsicherheit’, in: C. Joerges, T. Pinkel and U. Uetzmann 
(eds.), Josef Falke zum 65. Geburtstag (Bremen: Zentrum für Europäische Rechtspolitik 2014), pp. 137-152. 
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they could not know whether their breast implants contained industrial silicone gel due to the 
random nature of PIP’s fraud. The only way to find out was for the breast implants to be 
removed. Because preliminary studies indicated that PIP breast implants showed significant 
higher rates of rupture and “gel bleed”,3 and several public health safety agencies thus advised 
women to have their implants removed or replaced, many victims indeed decided to undergo 
surgery. As a result, they claimed to have suffered both material and immaterial damage.  
Because PIP went bankrupt in 2010, it was not realistic for victims to bring a direct action against 
the manufacturer. As a result, victims had to search for alternative strategies to obtain 
compensation. They have started legal proceedings in different European jurisdictions against a 
whole range of parties involved in the production, distribution and medical use of PIP breast 
implants.4 While some victims decided to bring an action against PIP’s insurer, Allianz, others 
decided to claim compensation from the doctors who had placed the breast implants, or the 
clinics and hospitals where the implants had been placed. Because of many legal and practical 
issues that came up in bringing these cases to court (e.g. private international law issues, 
evidential issues and problems with the solvency of defendants), another group of victims 
decided to hold the national public health agency liable for a failure to adequately supervise the 
trade in medical devices and to protect end users against unsafe breast implants. Finally, in 
Germany and France, a number of individual cases and group litigation claims were brought 
against TÜV, the certification body that carried out conformity assessments which PIP was 
required to undergo based on EU law before it could place its breast implants on the EU market. 
One such case in Germany has now resulted in a judgment by the CJEU in Schmitt. This 
                                                   
3 European Commission, Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR), 
“Opinion on the safety of Poly Implant Prothèse (PIP) Silicone Breast Implants”: 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/docs/scenihr_o_043.pdf, p. 52. 
4 See in detail, Van Leeuwen, “PIP Breast Implants, the EU’s New Approach for Goods and Market Surveillance by 
Notified Bodies” (2014) 5 European Journal of Risk Regulation 338, 341-346, P. Rott and C. Glinski, “Die Haftung 
der Zertifizierungsstelle im Produktsicherheitsrecht” (2015) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 192, 196-199,  
P.W.J. Verbruggen and B.J. van Leeuwen, “Europese regelgeving inzake medische hulpmiddelen: Het PIP-schandaal, 
de ‘Nieuwe Aanpak’ en consumentenbescherming” (2015) Tijdschrift voor Consumentenrecht en Handelspraktijken 
111 and J. De Bruyne and C. Vanleenhove, “Liability in the Medical Sector: The ‘Breast-Taking’ Consequences of the 
Poly Implant Prothèse Case” (2016) 24 European Review of Private Law 823.  
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judgment will have a significant impact on the outcome of other cases and will, therefore, be the 
main focus of this article. However, before we can fully address the CJEU’s judgment, the EU’s 
regulatory framework for breast implants should be explained. 
The regulatory framework of the New Approach 
TÜV is a private certification body incorporated in Germany, with subsidiaries around the world. 
It provides global certification services to assess and control the conformity of products, services, 
staff, manufacturing processes and quality management systems. TÜV had concluded a contract 
with PIP to carry out conformity assessment procedures regarding PIP’s breast implants. The 
Medical Devices Directive required this conformity assessment procedure to take place before 
PIP could place its products on the market.5 As such, this Directive regulated the production of 
and trade in breast implants on the European market.  
The Medical Devices Directive is part of the so-called New Approach, a legislative programme 
developed in the 1980s to improve the free movement of goods in the EU.6 With the New 
Approach, the EU adopts directives and regulations in which the essential requirements with 
which products have to comply are laid down. The precise technical specifications are then laid 
down in a European harmonised standard that is developed by one of the European 
standardisation bodies – CEN, CENELEC or ETSI. After the European Commission has 
published a reference to this standard in the Official Journal of the EU (“OJEU”), a presumption 
arises that products which comply with the harmonised standard also comply with the essential 
requirements of the relevant directive. As such, establishing compliance with a harmonised 
standard has become the main way for manufacturers to show that their products comply with 
                                                   
5 Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices [1993] OJ L 169/1. The European 
Parliament and Council recently adopted two Regulations which will replace the Directive in the course of 2020. See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press- release_MEMO-17-848_en.htm/.  
6 See, in general, (and with further references) H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2005). pp. 227-246, C. Hodges, European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2005), pp. 53-73 and, most recently, B. van Leeuwen, European Standardisation of Services and its Impact on Private 
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017), pp. 40-47. 
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the relevant European legislation. Although it is possible for manufacturers to show that they 
comply with the European legislation through other means, in practice most manufacturers 
choose to show that their products comply with the European standard.7 
In order to show that their products satisfy the requirements of the European legislation, 
manufacturers have to place a CE marking on their products. For certain categories of products 
which are not considered risky, manufacturers can place the CE marking on their products 
without any pre-market control by external parties. For other products in a higher risk category, 
the manufacturer cannot individually place the CE marking on their products. In these cases, a 
“notified body” will carry out a conformity assessment procedure to verify whether the products 
comply with the European harmonised standard. The term “notified bodies” is used because 
these certification bodies have been notified to the European Commission by the Member State 
in which they are based. Certification bodies are then considered competent to carry out 
conformity assessment procedures for a particular directive. As a result, there is a European list 
with notified bodies for each directive adopted under the New Approach. Most of the notified 
bodies – including TÜV Rheinland – are private, but some of the notified bodies are public 
bodies.8  
For the Medical Devices Directive, the obligations of notified bodies are set out in Annex II. 
Essentially, they can be divided in three categories: first, notified bodies have to inspect the 
quality system of the manufacturer;9 second, they have to inspect the design dossier;10 third, they 
have to undertake surveillance to ensure that the manufacturer continues to comply with the 
quality system.11 If the conformity assessment procedure is successful, the notified body has to 
                                                   
7 Van Leeuwen, European Standardisation of Services and its Impact on Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017), 42. See 
also H. Schepel, “The new approach to the New Approach: the juridification of harmonised standards in EU law” 
(2013) 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 521, 528.  
8 J.-P. Galland, “The Difficulties of Regulating Markets and Risks in Europe Through Notified Bodies” (2013) 4 
European Journal of Risk Regulation 365, 368. 
9 Article 3 of Annex II of the Medical Devices Directive. 
10 Article 4 of Annex II of the Medical Devices Directive. 
11 Article 5 of Annex II of the Medical Devices Directive. 
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provide to the applicant manufacturer a declaration of conformity, which enables the 
manufacturer to place the CE marking on its products and place their products on the European 
market.  
The various cases brought against TÜV essentially focussed on the precise obligations of TÜV 
based on its contractual arrangement with PIP. More specifically, they concerned the question of 
whether TÜV – either based on the contract with PIP or directly on the national legislation 
which had implemented the Medical Devices Directive – owed a duty of care towards the end 
users of PIP breast implants – the women who suffered harm after they had received these 
implants. 
The Judgment in Schmitt 
The factual background and the German proceedings 
In 2008, Elisabeth Schmitt received PIP breast implants in a private clinic in Germany. After the 
PIP scandal emerged in 2010, and more was revealed about the health risks associated with the 
use of industrial silicone gel, Ms Schmitt decided to have her implants removed. She could not 
prove that her breast implants contained industrial silicone gel. Nevertheless, she brought an 
action against TÜV Rheinland. 
Ms Schmitt claimed that if TÜV had performed its inspections and audits of PIP more strictly, 
and if it had used all powers provided to it under the Medical Devices Directive, it would have 
discovered the irregularities in PIP’s manufacturing process. Between 1998 and 2008, TÜV had 
carried out eight conformity assessment procedures at the PIP factory. On each occasion, TÜV 
had provided a declaration of conformity to PIP. Therefore, PIP could continue to place its 
implants on the market. All eight visits had been announced to PIP – none of them had been 
unannounced inspections. Moreover, TÜV had never physically inspected the implants. It had 
never audited the business records of PIP either. Ms Schmitt argued that if such inspections had 
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taken place, the fraud committed by PIP would have been revealed much earlier and the harm to 
women who had received PIP breast implants would have been avoided. She claimed 
compensation of €40,000 for the pain and suffering and the costs for the removal and 
replacement of her breast implants. She also argued that TÜV should be held liable for any future 
damage which would not be covered by her health insurance. 
In 2013, the German district court dismissed Ms Schmitt’s claim for three reasons.12 First of all, it 
held that she could not prove that she had suffered any harm. No evidence had been provided to 
suggest that she had suffered damage to her health. The sole risk that the breast implants could 
rupture was not sufficient to constitute harm. Secondly, Ms Schmitt had not provided any 
evidence to show that her breast implants contained industrial silicone gel. It would not have 
been difficult for her to have some testing done after the implants had been removed. Thirdly, 
the court held that TÜV had not breached any of its obligations under the Medical Devices 
Directive. It was under no obligation to carry out unannounced inspections, or to physically 
inspect the breast implants.  
On appeal, the court took a more principled approach and held that, under German private law, 
TÜV did not owe a contractual duty of care or a duty of care in tort towards the women who had 
received PIP breast implants.13 The aim of the conformity assessment procedure was to enable 
the manufacturer to place their products on the market. As a result, TÜV was not acting in the 
interests of women who received breast implants. The Medical Devices Directive did not impose 
obligations on TÜV vis-à-vis these end users. Even if TÜV did owe such a duty of care, the fraud 
committed by PIP had been so advanced that TÜV had not breached its duty. With its powers 
                                                   
12 Judgment of the Landgericht Frankenthal (Pfalz) of 14 March 2013 – 6 O 304/12, as discussed in detail by the 
authors cited in n 4 supra.  
13 Judgment of the Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken of 30 January 2014 – 4 U 66/13. These contractual and extra-
contractual grounds for liability concern the doctrine of der Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter (a contract with 
protective scope for third parties) and § 823 II Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (dealing with liability in tort for a breach of 
statutory rules) respectively. See, for more discussion, C. van Dam, European Tort Law (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 212. 
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under the Medical Devices Directive, it could not have been expected that TÜV had discovered 
the fraud.14 
Ms Schmitt appealed to the highest civil court in Germany, the Bundesgerichtshof. Under German 
law, Ms Schmitt’s chances of success depended to a significant extent on the purpose of the 
provisions of the Medical Devices Directive and the statutory rules implementing that directive in 
the national legal order (Medizinproduktegesetz)implementing measures on the conformity 
assessment procedure. German tort law requiresd that Ms Schmitt fell within the protective 
scope of these statutory provisions (Schutzgesetz) as a condition for the award of damages.15 
Therefore, the Bundesgerichtshof first of all asked the CJEU about the purpose and intention of 
the relevant provisions of the Directive. Was it the purpose and intention of the Directive that 
notified bodies responsible for the conformity assessment and surveillance act in order to protect 
all potential patients and may therefore, in the event of a culpable infringement of an obligation, 
have direct and unrestricted liability towards the patients concerned? The second and third 
question focussed on the precise obligations of TÜV under the Directive: are notified bodies 
under a general obligation to examine medical devices, or at least to examine them where there is 
due cause? Similarly, are notified bodies under a general obligation to examine the manufacturer’s 
business records and/or to carry out unannounced inspections, or at least to do so where there is 
due cause? 
The Judgment of the CJEU 
In February 2017, the CJEU delivered its judgment. It reversed the order of the questions of the 
Bundesgerichtshof and started by answering the second and third question together. The CJEU 
held that the Medical Devices Directive provides in detail how notified bodies have to act in 
                                                   
14 Rott and Glinski are very critical about the reasoning of the Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken and claim that the 
court misread the aim of the Medical Devices Directive and its implementing legislation. See Rott and Glinski, “Die 
Haftung der Zertifizierungsstelle im Produktsicherheitsrecht” (2015) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 192, 
204-208. 
15 § 823 II Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. 
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assessing the design dossier and the quality management system of manufacturers. The Directive 
does not impose a general obligation on notified bodies to carry out unannounced inspections, to 
examine devices or to inspect the business records of manufacturers. It only makes it possible for 
notified bodies to carry out unannounced inspections or to take additional testing to check the 
quality management system. Furthermore, the Directive makes it possible to carry out inspections 
of the manufacturer and to request all information necessary to be able to make and maintain the 
declaration of conformity.16 
In the exercise of their regulatory activities under the Medical Devices Directive, notified bodies 
must be allowed a certain degree of discretion. However, this degree of discretion is not 
unlimited and has to be “appropriate”.17 Otherwise, notified bodies would be free “not to take 
any steps in the face of evidence indicating that a medical device might not comply with the 
requirements” laid down in the Directive.18 If they did not act in the face of such evidence, they 
would be in breach of their obligations to take steps to withdraw, suspend or restrict the 
declaration of conformity whenever the requirements of the Directive are no longer met by the 
manufacturer.19 Therefore, notified bodies are under a “general obligation to act with all due 
diligence” in the context of performing their tasks in the conformity assessment procedure.20 As a 
result, they have to be alert and have to take appropriate action if they receive evidence which 
indicates that medical devices may not be complying with the requirements of the Directive.21  
The first question of the Bundesgerichtshof was split in two parts by the CJEU. First, it assessed 
what the aim of the Medical Devices Directive was. Second, it analysed whether a breach of the 
obligations under the Directive could give rise to liability vis-à-vis women like Schmitt who had 
received breast implants. The CJEU held that the aim of the Directive is also to protect the end 
                                                   
16 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [40] – [43]. 
17 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [45]. 
18 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [45]. 
19 Article 16(6) of the Medical Devices Directive. 
20 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [46]. 
21 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [47]. 
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users of medical devices.22 While the primary duty to ensure that medical devices are safe and 
comply with the Directive is imposed on the manufacturer, the Directive also imposes 
obligations on the Member States and notified bodies. The surveillance obligations imposed on 
these actors ensure protection for the health and safety of persons who receive medical devices. 
This is consistent with the wording and overall scheme of the Directive. Therefore, the purpose 
of the involvement of notified bodies is to protect the end users of medical devices.23  
The final issue was whether the aim of the involvement of notified bodies also meant that the 
Medical Devices Directive provided a right to patients to obtain damages from notified bodies. 
The CJEU held that the Directive does not create such a right. The Directive does not contain 
any provisions which grant a right to end users to hold notified bodies liable.24 Reference was 
made to Paul,25 in which the CJEU had held that EU legislation on the supervision of financial 
markets – the aim of which was to protect depositors – did not grant depositors a right to claim 
damages from supervisory agencies. Moreover, the CJEU held that the Directive did not aim to 
regulate the conditions under which notified bodies could be held liable. The fact that it imposed 
an obligation on notified bodies to take out civil liability insurance could not be used to claim 
that end users were granted a right of compensation, since no further details were provided on 
why the insurance had to be taken out.26 The Product Liability Directive, which provides for 
strict liability of manufacturers for personal injury and damage to property caused by defective 
products, did not exclude the possibility of other (national) systems of fault-based liability. 
Therefore, as the Court considered, the conditions under which notified bodies are liable to end 
users for a wrongful act –a culpable failure to fulfil their obligations under the Medical Devices 
                                                   
22 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [50]. 
23 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [51] – [53]. 
24 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [55]. 
25 Peter Paul and others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-222/02) ECLI:EU:C:2004:606. 
26 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [56] – [57]. 
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Directive – are governed by national law, subject to the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness.27  
No EU law-based liability of notified bodies 
It follows from the judgment in Schmitt that the CJEU does not consider the Medical Devices 
Directive to provide a right to end users to hold notified bodies liable. However, its reliance on 
its previous judgment in Paul to support this is not uncontroversial. In Paul, the CJEU held that 
the fact that public supervisory agencies in financial markets acted in the interests of depositors 
did not mean that depositors also had a right to hold the supervisory agencies liable. Its reasoning 
was twofold: first, the relevant directive did not expressly grant such a right;28 second, the 
coordination of national rules on the liability of public agencies was not necessary to ensure the 
effet utile of the relevant EU legislation.29 In Schmitt, the CJEU only focussed on the wording of the 
Medical Devices Directive. As such, the way in which Paul was applied was minimalistic. The 
CJEU did not place the Medical Devices Directive in the broader context of the regulatory 
approach of which it formed part. The question whether the liability of notified bodies was 
necessary to guarantee the effective functioning of the Medical Devices Directive in the context 
of the New Approach was not analysed. Similarly, the CJEU did not analyse whether the limited 
scope of the Product Liability Directive, which only provides for strict liability of manufacturers 
and parties who may be considered as such, requires that EU law should create an additional type 
of liability to guarantee that end users are adequately protected and are able to obtain damages if 
they suffer personal injury or property damage as a result of defective medical devices. 
Norbert Reich has argued very strongly that the reasoning in Paul should not be applied to the 
liability of notified bodies.30 He relied on the preambles of the Medical Devices Directive, which 
                                                   
27 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [58] – [59]. 
28 Paul (C-222/02) at [41]. 
29 Paul (C-222/02) at [42] – [44]. 
30 Reich, “Product Liability and Beyond: An Exercise in ‘Gap-Filling’” (2016) 24 European Review of Private Law 
619, 638. 
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stated that “medical devices should provide patients, users and third parties with a high level of 
protection”.31 The difference between Paul and Schmitt was that, in Paul, holding public 
supervisory agencies liable would go against the very aim of the applicable EU legislation, which 
was to create a single licence system for credit institutions. The Medical Devices Directive, on the 
contrary, explicitly identified the protection of end users as one of its objectives. Moreover, 
according to Reich, Paul was too specifically focussed on banking supervision for the judgment to 
be applied to Schmitt.32 This was also the conclusion of Advocate General Sharpston, who had 
rejected the arguments of the German State to apply the judgment by analogy.33  
Nevertheless, the CJEU has now applied Paul in the context of medical devices. The question 
remains whether it has only focussed on the provisions of the Medical Devices Directive – which 
could be seen as the first step of the CJEU’s approach in Paul –, or whether it has also implicitly 
rejected the more fundamental argument that liability of notified bodies is required to protect the 
effet utile of the Medical Devices Directive – the second step in Paul. The CJEU recognised that 
the protection of end users is one of its aims. Nevertheless, this objective does not provide end 
users with a right of compensation vis-à-vis notified bodies. As such, a somewhat artificial 
distinction is made between the obligation of notified bodies to protect end users and the right of 
those end users to hold notified bodies liable if they breach that obligation. In free movement 
law, the CJEU has held that a directly effective obligation on the part of a Member State or 
individual has as its corollary a right of the beneficiary of that obligation and, under certain 
circumstances, even an effective remedy.34 It may be that the CJEU did not find it necessary to go 
deeper into this question, because it knew that its conclusion that notified bodies perform the 
                                                   
31 Preambles of the Medical Devices Directive. 
32 Reich, “Product Liability and Beyond: An Exercise in ‘Gap-Filling’” (2016) 24 European Review of Private Law 
619, 635. 
33 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Schmitt (C-219/15) ECLI:EU:C:2016:694, at fn 27. 
34 In the famous Joined Cases of Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame III the CJEU held that: ‘in the event of infringement 
of a right directly conferred by a Community provision upon which individuals are entitled to rely before the national 
courts (…) the right to reparation is the necessary corollary of the direct effect of the Community provision whose 
breach caused the damage sustained’: Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-46/93) and The Queen v 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others (C-48/93), ECLI:EU:C:1996:79, at [22].  
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conformity assessment procedure with the aim to protect end users would be sufficient for the 
Bundesgerichtshof to tackle the question under German tort law as regards the protective scope 
of the statutory rules at play (Schutzgesetz). However, this does not provide a strong justification to 
refuse to engage with the more fundamental question.  
The CJEU’s reasoning in Schmitt demonstrates that the main objective of the New Approach, as 
shown by the legal basis of the Medical Devices Directive,35 is to improve free movement of 
goods in the EU, and not the safety of products.36 While the protection of end users is one of its 
aims, this aim is secondary to the primary aim of improving the internal market for goods.37 The 
effet utile of the New Approach does not require that the potential liability of notified bodies to 
end users is regulated by EU law itself – the protection of this aim can be left to national law.  
Finally, the CJEU concludes that the conditions governing the liability of notified bodies under 
national private law are subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.38 Here, the 
Court’s artificial distinction between rights and obligations comes back to bite. According to the 
Court, we are in the realm of procedural autonomy. However, one wonders why the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness are applicable if the Court held that there is no EU-law right for 
end users to claim compensation from notified bodies. The principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness limit the procedural autonomy of Member State in ensuring that a subjective right 
granted by EU law can be effectively relied upon before national courts or other state-based 
enforcement mechanisms. In Schmitt, the CJEU squarely rejected the existence of such a right. 
The only way to explain the CJEU’s reference to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness 
would be to say that the Medical Devices Directive provides an “abstract” right of protection to 
                                                   
35 Article 100a EEC (now Article 114 TFEU). 
36 A. McGee and S. Weatherill, “The Evolution of the Single Market – Harmonisation or Liberalisation?” (1990) 53 
Modern Law Review 578, 586-587. See for an early analysis of the relationship between free movement of goods and 
product safety in the New Approach J. Pelkmans, “The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and 
Standardization” (1987) 25 Journal of Common Market Studies 249. 
37 Van Leeuwen, “PIP Breast Implants, the EU’s New Approach for Goods and Market Surveillance by Notified 
Bodies” (2014) 5 European Journal of Risk Regulation 338, 349. See also C. Joerges, J. Falke and H. Micklitz, Die 
Sicherheit von Konsumgütern und die Entwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988) and N. Reich, 
“AGM-COS.MET or: who is protected by EC safety regulation?” (2008) 33 European Law Review 85. 
38 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [59]. 
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end users, which brings the case within the scope of procedural autonomy.39 By way of 
speculation, it might be said that Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights have played an important role in increasing the scope of application of the principles of 
procedural autonomy. After all, Article 19(1) provides that “Member States shall provide 
remedies sufficient to ensure legal protection in the fields covered by Union law”. This obligation 
is reinforced by the right to an effective remedy in Article 47 of the Charter. The precise 
relationship between these rights and the principles of equivalence and effectiveness remains 
uncertain.40 Nevertheless, bringing the case within the scope of procedural autonomy does not 
seem consistent with the main reasoning of the CJEU. It merely looks like an attempt to keep 
some level of EU control in a field where EU law has just withdrawn from. 
The impact of Schmitt on national damage actions 
According to the CJEU, the liability of TÜV vis-à-vis women who received PIP breast implants 
is governed by national private law. What implications does the judgment have in that national 
context? Does it improve the chances of the women to obtain compensation for the harm they 
suffered based on national law? Will it result in consistent outcomes across different Member 
States? These questions gain practical importance, since damage actions against TÜV have also 
been brought in France. More than 20 000 women around the world have opted in to join the 
latest French collective action. 
German 
                                                   
39 S. Weatherill, “Compulsory Notification of Draft Technical Regulations: the Contribution of Directive 83/189 to 
the Management of the Internal Market” (1996) 16 Yearbook of European Law 129, 198-202. See in general W. van 
Gerven, “Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures” (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 501 and  H. Schebesta, 
“Procedural Theory in EU Law” in K. Purnhagen and P. Rott, Varieties of Economic Law and Regulation (Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2014), 851-862, 856. 
40 See Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA (C-318/08), ECLI:EU:C:2010:146 and Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet 
(International) Ltd v Justitiekanslern (C-432/05), ECLI:EU:C:2007:163. See for more extensive analysis e.g. M. Safjan 
and D. Düsterhaus, “A Union of Effective Judicial Protection: Addressing a Multi-level Challenge through the Lens 
of Article 47 CFREU” (2014) 33 Yearbook of European Law 3, A. Arnull, “The Principle of Effective Judicial 
Protection in EU law: An Unruly Horse?” (2011) 36 European Law Review 51 and S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, 
“Redefining the Relationship between “Rewe-effectiveness” and effective judicial protection” (2011) 4 Review of 
European Administrative Law 31. J. Krommendijk “Is there light on the horizon? The distinction between ‘Rewe-
effectiveness’ and the principle of effective judicial protection in Article 47 of the Charter after Orizzonte” (2016) 53 
Common Market Law Review 1395. 
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One ground for Ms. Schmitt to establish the liability of TÜV for the damage she suffered is to 
show that TÜV violated its statutory rules under the Medical Devices Directive as transposed in 
national law (Medizinproduktegesetz). To be successful in that claim, German tort law, under the 
concept of Schutzgesetz of § 823 II BGB, requires as a matter of principle that, the statutory rules 
allegedly violated by TÜV protect the interests of Ms Schmitt.41 The CJEU’s judgment makes it 
clear that Ms Schmitt and women like her – as end users of PIP breast implants – are within the 
protective scope of the Medical Devices Directive and, by extension, the Medizinproduktegesetz. y 
One ground for Ms. Schmitt to establish the liability of TÜV for the damage they suffered is to 
show that TÜV violated its statutory obligations under the Medical Devices Directive as 
transposed in national law. As noted, here German tort law requires that the violated statutory 
rule protects the interests of Ms Schmitt (Schutzgesetz).42 The CJEU’s judgment makes it clear that 
women like Ms Schmitt – as end users of PIP breast implants – are within that protective scope. 
As a result, TÜV was under an obligation to take into account the legitimate interests of potential 
users of the implants when it performed conformity assessment procedures at PIP under the 
Medical Devices Directive.43 Before, the German Court of Appeal had concluded that Ms 
Schmitt was not within the protective scope of the statutory rules and had dismissed her action 
for this reason.44  
While the CJEU’s judgment removes one important obstacle for victims to hold TÜV liable 
based on German private law, this does not necessarily mean that their damage actions will be 
successful. To obtain damages, they still have to prove that TÜV breached its duty of care and 
that this breach was attributable to it. In the case of Ms Schmitt, the Court of Appeal previously 
                                                   
41 § 823 II Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. See also at n 15 supra. 
42 See at n 15 supra. 
43 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [50] – [53]. See also P. Rott, “Pflichten und Haftung der “benannten Stelle” bei Hochrisiko-
Medizinprodukten (2017) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1146, 1147. 
44 Judgment of the Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken of 30 January 2014 – 4 U 66/13, para II.2 b) bb) and para II.3 d). 
Rott and Glinski already suggested this interpretation of the court of appeal was false. See Rott and Glinski, “Die 
Haftung der Zertifizierungsstelle im Produktsicherheitsrecht” (2015) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 192, 
204.  
 17 
 
held that that was no breach of the obligations TÜV owed under the national legislation which 
had implemented the Medical Devices Directive. Even if there had been a breach, the condition 
of culpability could not be established given the cunning nature of PIP’s fraud and given the fact 
that PIP had even been successful in hiding the fraud from the French public authorities.45  
The Bundesgerichtshof followed the Court of Appeal in this regard when it delivered its final 
judgment on 22 June 2017. It considered that no statutory duties had been violated.46 Based on 
the submissions of Ms Schmitt as allowed under German civil procedural law, it could not be 
held that TÜV knew or should have known about PIP’s non-compliance prior to the moment 
she received PIP breast implants.47 Since the BundesgerichtshofBGH concluded that no statutory 
duties had been violated and that TÜV is thus not liable to Ms Schmitt, the question of whether 
liability could be based either on German contract law or tort law for breach of statutory rules 
did not require discussion.48 
France 
The CJEU’s judgment in Schmitt is also of importance to the damage actions brought against 
TÜV in France.49 In 2013, the District Court of Toulon held in a collective action brought by 1 
599 victims from Brazil, France and the UK, as well as six distributors of PIP breast implants, 
                                                   
45 Judgment of the Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken of 30 January 2014 – 4 U 66/13, para. II.3 d) en e). The district 
court considered that Ms Schmitt would face difficulties in meeting the standard of proof for causation: Judgment of 
the Landgericht Frankenthal (Pfalz) of 14 March 2013 – 6 O 304/12, 138. 
46 Judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof of 22 June 2017 – VII ZR 36/14, at [26] – [29]. 
47 Judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof of 22 June 2017 – VII ZR 36/14, at [30] – [33]. It is unclear what evidence 
could possibly establish such non-compliance. The CJEU nor the Medical Devices Directive provide any guidance to 
the national court. This is a salient issue. Given that the CJEU has held that there is no obligation on the part of 
TÜV to perform unannounced inspections, the question arises how TÜV could have known about the fraud other 
than from public sources of information. It is very unlikely that a certification body like TÜV will discover non-
compliance like PIP’s fraud only through announced inspections. The purpose of certification under the New 
Approach (and in general) is not to detect fraud. Its success largely depends on the willingness of regulated firms to 
play by the rules. See G. Jahn, M. Schramm and A. Spiller, “The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a 
Consumer Policy Tool” (2005) 28 Journal of Consumer Policy 53, 55-56. 
48 Judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof of 22 June 2017 – VII ZR 36/14, at [36]. 
49 See, for a more detailed analysis, Van Leeuwen, “PIP Breast Implants, the EU’s New Approach for Goods and 
Market Surveillance by Notified Bodies” (2014) 5 European Journal of Risk Regulation 339, 345-346, and De Bruyne 
and Vanleenhove, “Liability in the Medical Sector: The ‘Breast-Taking’ Consequences of the Poly Implant Prothèse 
Case” (2016) 24 European Review of Private Law 823, 839-840. 
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that TÜV had breached its statutory duty “de contrôle, de surveillance et de vigilance”.50 Since 
French private law does not know a concept like Schutzgesetz, the district court was not troubled 
with the question of the protective scope of the national laws implementing the Medical Devices 
Directive.51 It held that TÜV should have used its powers under these national laws more 
effectively. If it had done so, the fraud would have been discovered. The district court also 
considered that TÜV had been required to take action after the finding of the US Food and Drug 
Administration in 2000 that PIP was using industrial silicone gel to manufacture breast implants. 
After this discovery, PIP breast implants were banned in the United States. The Toulon court 
finally awarded interim damages of about EUR 3 000 to each claimant. 
The Court of Appeal in Aix-en-Provence reversed the Toulon judgment. It held that the Medical 
Devices Directive did not create any obligation for TÜV to physically inspect implants and that 
the information provided by PIP did not provide any reason to conduct additional tests or 
unannounced inspections. As a result, TÜV had complied with its obligations under the Directive 
and had not acted wrongfully vis-à-vis the plaintiffs.52 Like the German Court of Appeal, the Aix-
en-Provence Court held that the cunning nature of PIP’s fraud meant that it could not have been 
expected that TÜV would have discovered the fraud.53 The findings of the US authorities in 2000 
were considered irrelevant.54 
In January 2017, the District Court of Toulon delivered its judgment in another collective action, 
now brought by over 20,000 victims from 14 countries, 8 distributors of PIP breast implants and 
25 medical facilities that had provided PIP implants to women.55 Again, the Toulon Court held 
TÜV liable and awarded interim damages to the claimants. In doing so, it followed the same 
                                                   
50 Judgment of the Tribunal de Commerce de Toulon of 14 November 2013, 2011F00517, p. 142. 
51 See also Rott and Glinski, “Die Haftung der Zertifizierungsstelle im Produktsicherheitsrecht” (2015) Zeitschrift 
für Europäisches Privatrecht 192, 203-204.  
52 Judgment of the Court of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence of 2 July 2015, 13/22482, p. 109, 113 and 119. 
53 Judgment of the Court of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence of 2 July 2015, 13/22482, p. 121-125. 
54 Judgment of the Court of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence of 2 July 2015, 13/22482, p. 121-122. 
55 Judgment of the Tribunal de Commerce de Toulon of 20 January 2017, 2014F00306, p. 307, 358, 367 and 396. See 
http://fr.reuters.com/article/frEuroRpt/idFRL5N1FA3TY?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0.  
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reasoning as it had done in the collective action in 2013. It did not refer in any way to the 
judgment of the Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal.56 TÜV has appealed this judgment. 
Schmitt is also important to the French litigation since the CJEU, unlike the Court of Appeal in 
Aix-en-Provence, laid down a general obligation to act with all due diligence in performing 
conformity assessment procedures. The French courts will now have to assess – similarly to what 
the Bundesgerichtshof did in its final judgment – whether TÜV complied with that obligation in 
the circumstances of the case. Again, the key question is whether and when TÜV could be 
considered to have known about PIP’s non-compliance and what measures it took in response. 
Given that this question is of a highly factual nature, it might be that, due to the different facts in 
the damage actions and differences in the applicable conditions for liability and standards of 
proof under French civil (procedural) law, a French court will reach a different conclusion on this 
issue from the Bundesgerichtshof. As such, uniformity as regards the liability of TÜV in Europe 
is anything but guaranteed.  
The regulation of medical devices in the EU after Schmitt 
In 2012, after the PIP scandal, the European Commission published a proposal for a new 
Regulation on medical devices, which would replace the Medical Devices Directive.57 In April 
2017, the final version of the Regulation was approved by the European Parliament.58 The 
Regulation will come into force in May 2020 and includes a number of important changes with 
regard to the obligations of notified bodies. Interestingly, all obligations which Ms Schmitt 
claimed notified bodies had under the Medical Devices Directive, have now been expressly 
incorporated in the Regulation.59 Notified bodies will have to carry out unannounced inspections 
                                                   
56 Judgment of the Tribunal de Commerce de Toulon of 20 January 2017, 2014F00306, p. 39-41. 
57 European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation on medical devices” COM(2012) 542 final. 
58 Regulation 2017/745 of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 April 2017 on medical devices, amending 
Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 and repealing Council 
Directives 90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC.  
59 One could say that this implicitly confirms that as a notified body TÜV was not obliged to carry out unannounced 
inspections at PIP and to physically inspect the PIP breast implants under the conformity assessment regime of the 
Medical Devices Directive. 
 20 
 
at least once in every five year.60 During these inspections, they are obliged to take samples of the 
certified products to assess whether they comply with the design dossier.61 Moreover, notified 
bodies have to verify that the amount of raw materials used by the manufacturer is consistent 
with the number of products which have been manufactured.62 Beyond the conformity 
assessment procedure, notified bodies will have to satisfy new requirements as regards inter alia 
their organisational structure, independence and impartiality, qualifications of personnel and 
contracted experts.63 Furthermore, the supervision of notified bodies by Member States is 
intensified.64 The Regulation also provides that a European database for medical devices should 
be created, so that medical devices can be traced from the moment of production until the end 
user.65 Again, the new Regulation does not provide for rules on the private law liability of notified 
bodies. 
Schmitt could be seen as an attempt to streamline the transition process from the Medical Devices 
Directive to the new Regulation. The judgment defines the obligations of notified bodies until 
the coming into force of the Regulation in 2020. Schmitt makes it clear that, until that time, 
notified bodies have to take action if they receive information which suggests that medical 
devices may no longer comply with the relevant European legislation.66 In such cases, they have 
to make full use of the powers given to them under the Directive, such as carry out unannounced 
on-site inspections or conduct physical tests on devices. No general obligation exists to organise 
such inspections or tests until the new Regulation comes into force.67 However, the general 
obligation imposed on notified bodies in Schmitt on the basis of the Medical Devices Directive to 
do all they reasonably can to ensure that the declaration of conformity is valid will most likely 
                                                   
60 Article 3.4 of Annex IX of Regulation 2017/745 . 
61 Article 3.4 of Annex IX of Regulation 2017/745 
62 Article 3.5 of Annex IX of Regulation 2017/745. 
63 Articles 1.1, 1.2, 3.2 and 3.4 of Annex VII of Regulation 2017/745. 
64 Articles 44 and 45 of Regulation 2017/745. 
65 Articles 27 – 29 of Regulation 2017/745. 
66 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [47] – [48]. These obligations follow from Article 16(6) of the Medical Devices Directive and 
are focussed on the question of whether the medical devices should still be allowed to be placed on the EU market 
(market access).  
67 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [40]. 
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continue to apply under the new Regulation. Like the Directive, the Regulation provides that the 
assessment activities of notified bodies are aimed at ensuring that the manufacturer meets – and 
continues to meet – the requirements as set out in the Regulation and that these bodies must 
suspend or withdraw the certificate, or impose any other appropriate restrictions on it, if the 
manufacturer no longer meets those requirements.68 
Constitutionalisation of private regulation 
As a final consideration of the implications of Schmitt, we argue that this judgment is to be 
understood as being part of a broader trend in the case law of the CJEU, in which it has gradually 
submitted private standardisation and certification activities to fundamental principles of EU law. 
This “constitutionalisation” of private regulation clearly emerged in Fra.bo and, more recently, in 
James Elliott. In Schmitt, the CJEU continues along this path and adds that notified bodies acting 
under the New Approach owe a duty of care to end users of products.69 
James Elliott 
In November 2016, the CJEU delivered its judgment in James Elliott.70 This case concerned a 
private law dispute about the interpretation of a European harmonised standard for construction 
materials. This standard had been developed under the New Approach. The national version of 
the standard was incorporated in a sales contract between a construction company, James Elliott, 
and a supplier of concrete to be used in the Irish construction sector, Irish Asphalt. James Elliott 
had used concrete supplied by Irish Asphalt in the construction of a youth facility. After a certain 
                                                   
68 See Article 56(4) of Regulation 2017/745 and Articles 2.3, 3.1 and 3.7 of Annex IX of Regulation 2017/745. 
69 Arguably, A.G.M.-COS.MET, which concerned the liability of the Finnish State for unauthorized safety warnings 
by one of its public officials concerning an Italian product bearing the CE marking, could also be considered part of 
this line of case law. However, in this case, the CJEU did not explicitly assess the standardisation and certification 
activities involved in the light of EU law. Instead, it chose to focus entirely on the matter of State liability for breach 
of EU law. A.G.M.-COS.MET Srl v Suomen valtio and Tarmo Lehtinen (C-470/03) ECLI:EU:C:2007:213 at [74] as 
discussed by N. Reich, “AGM-COS.MET or: who is protected by EC safety regulation?” (2008) 33 European Law 
Review 85, 89. 
70 James Elliott Construction Ltd v Irish Asphalt Ltd (C-613/14) ECLI:EU:C:2016:821. See, for more detailed analysis, A. 
Volpato, “Harmonised standards before the ECJ: James Elliott Construction” (2017) 54 Common Market Law 
Review 591 and K. Purnhagen, “Voluntary “New Approach” Technical Standards are Subject to Judicial Scrutiny by 
the CJEU! – The Remarkable CJEU judgment “Elliott” on Private Standards” 2017/05 Wageningen Working Papers 
in Law and Governance, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2988895. 
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period of time, the concrete floors and ceilings of the facility started to show cracks. This was 
caused by the chemical composition of the supplied concrete. James Elliott argued that Irish 
Asphalt had breached its obligations under national sales law to supply construction materials of 
“merchantable quality” which were “fit for purpose”.  
The defence of Irish Asphalt turned this very national sales law dispute into a major case for EU 
constitutional law. Irish Asphalt argued that the European standard incorporated in the sales 
contract laid down methods to establish how and when a product complied with the technical 
specifications in the standard. Therefore, the question arose which rules – either national sales 
law or the European standard – determined the conformity of the products supplied. Irish 
Asphalt argued that the relevant harmonised standard should be considered as EU law. As a 
result, it should have primacy over national sales law and preclude national sales law from 
imposing additional conditions such as “merchantable quality” and “fit for purpose” on suppliers 
to determine the conformity of the supplied construction materials. The first question for the 
CJEU was therefore whether harmonised standards adopted under the New Approach were part 
of EU law, and as such, whether it had jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation of these standards. 
The CJEU answered this first question in the positive. This was despite the fact that harmonised 
standards are developed by organisations which are governed by private law and are not 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union. Similarly, it did not matter that these 
standards have no binding legal status. The CJEU held that these standards are part of EU law 
because they are measures implementing or applying an act of EU law. After all, the Commission 
publishes their references in the OJEU and they have a legal effect under the New Approach.71 
                                                   
71 Elliott (C-613/14) at [34], [37] and [42]. 
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For this reason, James Elliott has an important constitutional dimension: harmonised standards are 
part of EU law and the CJEU has the ultimate authority over their interpretation.72 
A key consequence of James Elliott is that individual contracting parties, within the context of a 
preliminary reference procedure, can now ask the CJEU about the validity and interpretation of 
European harmonised standards in disputes over the performance of a contract.73 While the 
CJEU did not review the substance of the harmonised standard at issue in this case,74 it provided 
an interpretation of the private standard which was required for the outcome of the underlying 
contractual dispute.75 Despite the fact that the disputing parties may not have been involved in 
the adoption of the European standard, they can now challenge the validity and interpretation of 
such a standard through the preliminary reference procedure. Seen in this way, James Elliott 
enables third parties to obtain effective judicial protection against the influence private standards 
have on their legal position in private law disputes. It thus constitutionalises private 
standardisation within the New Approach. 
This process of constitutionalisation raises various institutional issues. First of all, one can 
wonder how the CJEU should go about interpreting harmonised standards. Inevitably, questions 
will come up that go to the very substance of the standards. Do its judges possess the necessary 
skills to review this substance? What standard of review applies?76 The Court will need to sort out 
how it will organise its review. In James Elliott it remains unclear how it will do so. Second, the 
question arises of whether the preliminary reference procedure is the right forum to provide 
effective judicial protection to private parties against private standardisation. Would this not 
change the character of the preliminary reference procedure from a procedure about the validity 
                                                   
72 Elliott (C-613/14) at [40].  
73 Elliott (C-613/14) at [48] – [53].  
74 Elliott (C-613/14) at [51].  
75 Where in James Elliott the dispute was about the performance of a contract, compliance with a harmonized 
standard may also be of relevance in tort law actions. See, in detail, Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), pp. 339ff. 
76 See, in the same vein, Schepel, “The new approach to the New Approach: the juridification of harmonised 
standards in EU law” (2013) 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 521, 532-533.   
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and correct interpretation of EU law into a so-called “citizens’ infringement procedure”?77 Third, Van 
Gestel and Micklitz have argued that by providing effective judicial protection against private 
standardisation bodies, the walls of these bodies’ “club houses” will break down. In their 
argument, an increased influence of public law – whether national constitutional law or EU law – 
on private standardisation requires a rethinking of the organisation of this form of private 
regulation.78 In James Elliott, the CJEU did not address this issue of the governance of private 
standardisation. How will the judgment affect the internal procedures and business models of 
private standardisation bodies?79 
One particularly important issue on this last point is that private standardisation bodies own the 
copyright in their standards. They argue that their business models are to a significant extent 
based on the revenues they earn from selling their standards – which are copyright-protected – to 
end users.80 Since it is not normally possible to protect legislation by copyright and harmonised 
standards are now considered part of EU law, the question of whether these bodies can continue 
to apply the same business model is evident.81 However, the judgment in Elliott is of no help in 
answering this question.82 As a result, we will have to wait for a new case for the CJEU to have an 
opportunity to address this issue.  
Fra.bo 
                                                   
77 See, in general, B. de Witte, ‘The preliminary ruling dialogue: the types of questions posed by national courts’, in B. 
de Witte et al.. (eds.), National Courts and EU Law: New Issues, Theories and Methods (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016) 
pp. 15-25. 
78 R. van Gestel and H.-W. Micklitz, “European integration through standardization: How judicial review is breaking 
down the club house of private standardization bodies” (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 145. 
79 See also Volpato, “Harmonised standards before the ECJ: James Elliott Construction” (2017) 54 Common Market 
Law Review 591, 601-602 and Purnhagen, “Voluntary “New Approach” Technical Standards are Subject to Judicial 
Scrutiny by the CJEU! – The Remarkable CJEU judgment “Elliott” on Private Standards” 2017/05 Wageningen 
Working Papers in Law and Governance, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2988895. 
80 See Van Gestel and Micklitz, “European integration through standardization: How judicial review is breaking 
down the club house of private standardization bodies” (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 145, 160ff. 
81 See Volpato, “Harmonised standards before the ECJ: James Elliott Construction” (2017) 54 Common Market Law 
Review 591, 598-599. 
82 Advocate-General Campos Sanchez-Bordona did consider the matter in his Opinion in James Elliot (at [51]). He 
noted briefly that the inclusion of harmonised standards within the scope of EU would have “a very significant 
impact on the European standardisation system”. However, he did not find it necessary to consider this question in 
detail. 
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The CJEU has also applied EU law to private standardisation and certification activities in a 
different context. This happened in Fra.bo,83 which was about a contractual dispute between 
Fra.bo, an Italian manufacturer of copper fittings, and the Vereinigung des Gas- und 
Wasserfaches (DVGW), a German not-for-profit association which developed technical 
standards for the national gas and water sector. Fra.bo sought to place its copper fittings for the 
gas and water sector on the German market, but under German law it first had to obtain a safety 
certificate. In practice, for Fra.bo, certification by DVGW was the only way to obtain this 
certificate. Therefore, the Italian firm concluded a contract with DVGW to have its fittings 
certified. However, in the performance of the contract, DVGW refused to recognise the positive 
test results on the basis of which Fra.bo’s fittings where lawfully traded in Italy. As a result, 
Fra.bo was denied access to the German market. 
Fra.bo then sued DVGW for a breach of contract. In this context, it argued that DVGW had 
breached Article 34 TFEU, which prohibits quantitative restrictions on import and all measures 
having equivalent effect. While the CJEU had previously held that Article 34 TFEU did not have 
horizontal direct effect and could therefore not apply to contractual arrangements,84 in Fra.bo it 
opened the door for Article 34 TFEU to have horizontal direct effect. Despite the fact that 
DVGW was a body governed by private law, the CJEU held that, given its authority to certify 
products, it de facto had the power to regulate access to the German market.85 Consequently, 
DVGW’s standardisation and certification activities – exercised through the contract concluded 
with Fra.bo – were held to be subject to the prohibition laid down in Article 34 TFEU.86 
Fra.bo makes it clear that even private standardisation and certification activities which take place 
outside the scope of the New Approach cannot escape review under Article 34 TFEU provided 
                                                   
83 Fra.bo SpA v DVGW eV (C-171/11), ECLI:EU:C:2012:453. 
84 See extensively C. Krenn, “A Missing Piece in the Horizontal Effect “Jigsaw”: Horizontal Direct Effect and the 
Free Movement of Goods” (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 177. 
85 Fra.bo (C-171/11) at [27] – [31]. 
86 See L. Gormley, “Private Parties and the Free Movement of Goods: Responsible, Irresponsible, or a Lack of 
Principles” (2015) 38 Fordham International Law Journal 993, 1001-1003. See also B. van Leeuwen, “Private 
Regulation and Public Responsibility in the Internal Market” (2014) 33 Yearbook of European Law 277. 
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that national law attributes an important role to the certification in obtaining access to the 
market.87 For the contractual dispute between Fra.bo and DVGW, the CJEU’s judgment implied 
that the certification body could not impose additional discriminatory conditions on Fra.bo that 
would impede access to the German market. More specifically, DVGW had to recognize the 
positive test results provided by Fra.bo on the basis of which its products were legally traded in 
Italy, and as such, had to award the required certificate. By refusing to do so, it breached its 
contractual obligations vis-à-vis Fra.bo.88  
Back to Schmitt 
Schmitt adds to Fra.bo and James Elliot that notified bodies acting under the New Approach are 
required to act with all due diligence in conducting conformity assessment procedures.89 This 
duty fundamentally limits the margin of discretion notified bodies possess based on their 
expertise and professionalism in verifying and keeping under surveillance products and 
manufacturers. Notified bodies must now take all necessary steps to ensure the correctness of the 
declaration of conformity. As such, the CJEU has introduced a new duty of care owed to end 
users of products for notified bodies within the New Approach. A breach of this duty may give 
rise to civil liability under national law, which is required to provide effective remedies against the 
breach of their duty of care. Accordingly, the CJEU has imposed another control mechanism on 
private regulatory activities that fall within the scope of EU law.  
In conclusion, it follows from the trilogy of Fra.bo, James Elliot and Schmitt that the CJEU submits 
forms of private regulation to fundamental principles of EU law (effective judicial protection, 
                                                   
87 Frabo has triggered discussions around the question of whether and to what extent the CJEU has now brought the 
free movement of goods in line with the free movement of persons and services, for which the Court has long 
accepted that these freedoms have horizontal direct effect. See for elaborate discussions on this question H. van 
Harten and T. Nauta, “Towards horizontal direct effect for the free movement of goods? Comment on Fra.bo” 
(2013) 38 European Law Review 677, 686-689, B. van Leeuwen, “From Status to Impact, and the Role of National 
Legislation: The Application of Article 34 TFEU to a Private Certification Organisation in Fra.bo” (2013) 4 
European Journal of Risk Regulation 405 and P. Verbruggen, ‘The Impact of Free Movement of Goods and Services 
on Private Law Rights and Remedies’ in H-W. Micklitz and C. Sieburgh (eds.), Primary EU Law and Private Law 
Concepts (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017), pp. 47-91. 
88 Judgment of the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf of 14 August 2013, VI-2 U (Kart), [48] – [54]. 
89 Schmitt (C-219/15) at [46]. 
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free movement law) whenever private regulation affects the legal position of individuals who seek 
to gain access to the European market or who fall victim to regulatory activities on that market 
which are exercised by private parties. This constitutionalisation of private regulation is 
unavoidable. A growing influence of private standardisation and certification in public life calls 
for a stronger degree of public accountability.90 Some have doubted whether this development is 
a positive one. Schepel, for example, argued after Fra.bo that this judgment would sooner 
“paralyse” European standardisation than that it would strengthen its integrity.91 
Constitutionalisation indeed carries with it the risk that private standardisation and certification, 
which were introduced as alternatives to public regulation, eventually assume the same 
characteristics of precisely that type of regulation. As a result, they may lose their appeal – both 
for the industry and for the legislature.92 However, from the perspective of judicial protection, 
the judgments in Schmitt, James Elliot and Fra.bo should be welcomed. The CJEU more and more 
enables individuals who are subject to the influence of private standardisation and certification 
bodies to enforce their legitimate interests before national courts with the help of EU law. 
                                                   
90 Cf. J. Black, “Constitutionalising self-regulation” (1996) 1 Modern Law Review 24. See also Van Gestel and 
Micklitz, “European integration through standardization: how judicial review is breaking down the club house of 
private standardization bodies” (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 145, 150. 
91 Schepel, “The new approach to the New Approach: the juridification of harmonised standards in EU law” (2013) 
20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 521, 533. 
92 See for an analysis of forms of private regulation encouraged under the EU Better Regulation programme: P. 
Verbruggen, “Private Regulation in EU Better Regulation: Past Performance and Future Promises” (2017) 19 
European Journal of Law Reform 121. 
